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Abstract
Are citizens willing to accept journalistic fact-checks of misleading claims from can-
didates they support and to update their attitudes about those candidates? Previous
studies have reached conflicting conclusions about the effects of exposure to counter-
attitudinal information. As fact-checking has become more prominent, it is therefore
worth examining how respondents respond to fact-checks of politicians — a question
with important implications for understanding the effects of this journalistic format
on elections. We present results to two experiments conducted during the 2016 cam-
paign that test the effects of exposure to realistic journalistic fact-checks of claims
made by Donald Trump during his convention speech and a general election debate.
These messages improved the accuracy of respondents’ factual beliefs, even among
his supporters, but had no measurable effect on attitudes toward Trump. These re-
sults suggest that journalistic fact-checks can reduce misperceptions but often have
minimal effects on candidate evaluations or vote choice.
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Journalistic fact-checking is an important new form of political news coverage (e.g., Spivak
2011; Graves 2016). However, little is known about its effects on citizens. Do they accept
fact-checks that conflict with their political affiliations or shrug off those that contradict
the claims of their preferred candidates? These questions have important implications
for debates over citizen competence and the quality of governance in democracies (e.g.,
Hochschild and Einstein 2015; Jamieson 2015).
Concerns about people’s willingness to accept unwelcome factual information like
counter-attitudinal fact-checks have become sowidespread that OxfordDictionaries named
post-truth the word of the year after the 2016 U.S. elections (BBC 2016). These concerns
are well-justified. Some research indicates, for instance, that people can be highly resis-
tant to journalistic fact-checks. Nyhan and Reifler (2010) find that corrective information
in mock news articles frequently fails to reduce salient misperceptions and can even in-
crease the prevalence of misperceptions among ideologically vulnerable groups compared
to those who read an article with no correction — a “backfire effect.” Other studies us-
ing relatively balanced formats have also found stiff resistance to uncongenial journalistic
fact-checks (e.g., Nyhan, Reifler, and Ubel 2013; Garrett, Nisbet, and Lynch 2013; Jarman
2016). Citizens may be especially resistant to unwelcome fact-checks during campaigns,
which frequently stimulate motivated reasoning (e.g., Lenz 2012).
By contrast, other studies find that fact-checking and other types of factual information
can partly overcome directionally motivated reasoning and reduce, or “debunk,” misper-
ceptions (e.g., Weeks 2015; Nyhan and Reifler N.d.; Wood and Porter 2018; Chan et al.
2017). Notably, Wood and Porter (2018) examine 52 issue areas and observe no evidence
of backfire effects. They do, however, find widespread evidence of motivated reasoning—
for approximately 80% of issues tested, responsiveness to corrective information varied
by ideology (unlike Nyhan and Reifler N.d.).
We thus confront conflicting expectations about how people might respond to journal-
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istic fact-checks during a general election campaign. Citizens may resist fact-checks that
conflict with their partisan or ideological commitments and maintain (or even strengthen)
their misperceptions. Alternately, people might accept journalistic fact-checks and update
their beliefs to be at least somewhat more accurate.
We present results of two studies conducted during the 2016 U.S. presidential cam-
paign that help illuminate this debate. Both studies examine actual misstatements that
were made by candidates and their proxies and fact-checked by the media during the cam-
paign — a time when partisan commitments are activated and the influence of partisan
leaders is likely to be especially strong (e.g., Zaller 1992; Lenz 2012). Specifically, Study
1 is a preregistered survey experiment that evaluates the effects of a journalistic fact-check
of misleading claims about crime made by Donald Trump at the GOP convention. To
increase the realism of the study’s evaluation of the effects of journalistic fact-checking
in a campaign, Study 1 also includes experimental conditions in which a political elite
attempts to denigrate and undermine the fact-check in question. Study 2 tests the effect
of fact-checking a claim Trump made about unemployment during the first presidential
debate among subjects experimentally induced to have watched the debate.
The design of these studies was intended to address two potential explanations for
conflicting findings in the literature. In many cases, respondents in survey experiments
may lack motivation to engage in effortful resistance to unwelcome factual information
about relatively obscure topics or lack sufficient context to form counter-arguments. The
lack of suchmotivations or context could explain the null or mixed results described above.
To address these concerns, we administered both studies at the height of a presidential
general election campaign and designed them to maximize partisan directional motiva-
tions. In Study 1, we tested corrections of a presidential candidate’s convention accep-
tance speech shortly after it was delivered; in study 2, we tested corrections of a candidate
on the night of a presidential debate among a sample that was encouraged to watch the
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debate. In addition, while many facts are not the subject of political controversy, we tested
fact-checks of claims that one candidate (Trump) used to criticize the other (Clinton), a
context in which directionally motivated reasoning may be common.
Second, given that counter-arguing of unwelcome political information may be greater
when relevant considerations are available, the first experiment experimentally manipu-
lates the availability of messages denigrating the fact-check. In this study, we randomly
paired a fact-check of a Trump statement with a statement by Trump campaign chairman
Paul Manafort denying the correction and provided an additional Manafort statement as-
cribing a political motivation to the FBI, the source of the data in the fact-check. These
messages should reduce the cognitive demands of counter-argument for low-information
respondents and provide additional considerations upon which high-information Trump
supporters can draw, increasing the realism of the information environment in which the
fact-check is delivered and the likelihood of observing motivated resistance.
The design of these studies also allows us to investigate other important theoretical
questions about the effects of fact-checking. First, we consider whether people are willing
to not only revise their factual beliefs in response to a fact-check but to change their atti-
tudes toward the candidate who has made a claim that has been fact-checked — an effect
that would likely increase the reputational threat that fact-checking poses to politicians
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(see, e.g., Nyhan and Reifler 2015).1 In addition, our first study tests whether people are
willing to accept attitude-inconsistent information but instead change their interpretations
of that information in a directionally motivated manner. For instance, Gaines et al. (2007)
find that Democrats and Republicans updated their beliefs about the Iraq war relatively ac-
curately over time; it was interpretations of those facts that diverged along partisan lines.
Khanna and Sood (2018) similarly find that incentivized respondents provide more correct
answers but perceived greater unfairness in the study when doing so.
Our results indicate that exposure to fact-checks reduced misperceptions among sup-
porters of both major party presidential candidates but did not affect attitudes toward those
candidates. In Study 1, exposure to fact-checking reduced misperceptions about crime
rates even when respondents were provided a message by a Trump staffer disparaging
the fact-check. Similarly, providing a fact-check of Trump just after a debate in Study 2
reduced misperceptions about unemployment in Michigan and Ohio, even among Trump
supporters. In short, journalistic fact-checks can overcome directionally motivated reason-
ing and bring people’s beliefs more in line with the facts evenwhen the counter-attitudinal
information is disparaged by a co-partisan. However, neither Clinton nor Trump support-
ers changed their attitudes towards either candidate after receiving fact-checks, suggesting
that voters’ preferences during a presidential election are not contingent on their percep-
1Wintersieck (2017) is a notable exception. There are crucial differences between our
study and hers, however. First, whereas Wintersieck looks at candidates deemed “honest”
by fact-checkers, our studies examine statements flagged by fact-checkers for being false.
Second, while Wintersieck focuses on a statewide election and recruits student subjects at
a university, we enroll broader pools of participants in two experiments about a national
election. This sampling distinction is particularly relevant here given that students might
be more disposed to engage in the effortful cognition required to counterargue unwelcome
information such as fact-checks (Krupnikov and Levine 2014).
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tions of the factual accuracy of the candidates. In other words, factual corrections can
achieve the limited objective of creating a more informed citizenry but struggle to change
citizens’ minds about whom to support.
Theory and hypotheses
Our theoretical approach builds on research suggests that people have competing goals
in information processing (e.g., Kunda 1990; Molden and Higgins 2005). When people
have stronger accuracy goals (e.g., they are provided a reward for each correct answer
as in Hill 2017), respondents will process information more dispassionately and seek to
maximize the accuracy of their beliefs. When directional motivations are more salient
(e.g., party identity or a preferred candidate), respondents will instead tend to process
information in a manner that is consistent with that preference rather than maximizing
accuracy or considering information in a dispassionate manner (Taber and Lodge 2006;
Bolsen, Druckman, and Cook 2014).
These findings suggest that directionally motivated reasoning may be an especially
salient factor when people process factual information about controversial political issues
in a highly partisan context such as a presidential election campaign. As discussed above,
however, researchers have reached mixed conclusions about the extent to which direc-
tionally motivated reasoning affects belief updating in response to fact-checking in such
contexts (e.g., Nyhan and Reifler 2010; Nyhan, Reifler, and Ubel 2013; Garrett, Nisbet,
and Lynch 2013 versusWeeks 2015; Nyhan and Reifler N.d.; Wood and Porter 2018; Chan
et al. 2017; Porter and Kirby 2018). Other research suggests that directional motivations
may have greater influence on interpretations of contested facts (Gaines et al. 2007) than
on factual beliefs themselves; we also consider this possibility.
To adjudicate among these claims, we test three preregistered hypotheses based on
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the empirical literature and theoretical considerations discussed above.2 In each case,
we determine whether information is pro- or counter-attitudinal by whether respondents
indicate supporting Trump or Hillary Clinton on a pre-treatment vote choice measure.
First, we propose to test whether fact-checking is ineffective at increasing the accuracy
of factual beliefs among people for whom it is counter-attitudinal (H1; see Nyhan and
Reifler 2010) or whether fact-checks increase belief accuracy but acceptance is greater
among those for whom the information is pro-attitudinal (H2; seeWood and Porter 2018)3
H1 (motivated resistance): Respondents will resist unwelcome facts about controversial
issues. As a result, people exposed to journalistic fact-checks that are counter-
attitudinal will not come to hold more accurate views. In some cases, their views
could even become more inaccurate. (Evaluated in studies 1 and 2.)
H2 (differential acceptance): Respondents will accept journalistic fact-checks that are
counter-attitudinal and update their beliefs to become more accurate, though the
extent to which they update their beliefs may vary based on their prior attitude.
(Evaluated in studies 1 and 2.)
2Our preregistration for Study 1 documents our hypotheses and analysis plan (URL
omitted for peer review). Unless otherwise noted, all Study 1 analyses are consistent with
this document. Study 2 was conducted too rapidly to be preregistered (it was fielded im-
mediately after the debate) but our analysis follows Study 1 to the greatest extent possible.
3As discussed above, previous findings are mixed on both hypotheses. For H1, see
Nyhan and Reifler (2010) (backfire on two of five studies) versus Wood and Porter (2018)
(no cases of backfire). For H2, compare Wood and Porter (2018), which finds a consistent
pattern of ideological differentials in belief updating, with Nyhan and Reifler (N.d.), which
finds no evidence of differential acceptance when fact-checks are pro-attitudinal.
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We also consider the effects of fact-checks on “interpretations” of factual claims. We de-
fine the term consistent with Gaines et al. (2007) who use it to include evaluations (“the
crime rate is high”), explanations (“crime has increased because of a decline in moral val-
ues”), and inferences (“Obama’s acceptance of this crime rate reveals indifference to our
plight”). In this context, respondents may be willing to accept a fact-check which contra-
dicts a favored politician but form an attitude-consistent interpretation of the information
that they have accepted. For instance, if conservative respondents are asked to accept a
contradiction of Trump’s claim about increase in violent crime, they might ascribe the
decline in crime to a factor that is consistent with their beliefs (e.g., tougher policing and
longer sentences). We therefore propose to test whether interpretations of factual claims
are formed and updated in a directionally motivated manner (H3; see Gaines et al. 2007):
H3 (attitude-consistent interpretation): Respondents will accept journalistic fact-checks
that are counter-attitudinal, but interpret them in an attitude-consistent manner.
(Evaluated in study 1 only.)
Finally, as noted above, we also evaluate a key research question — will people not only
revise their factual beliefs, but alter their attitudes toward a candidate who has made a
false or unsupported claim? We therefore also measure attitudes toward the candidate,
including vote preference.4 The voluminous literature on candidate evaluation and vote
choice in a presidential election provides unclear expectations. For instance, Funk (1999)
finds that perceived traits such as honesty condition overall evaluation of candidates in the
expected direction — candidates who are perceived as having integrity are more warmly
regarded. However, Rahn et al. (1990) and Pierce (1993) find no relationship between
perceived traits and vote choice even among sophisticated participants who are thought to
4Findings for two other preregistered research questions are described below and in the
online appendix.
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be capable of connecting potentially distal considerations. Accordingly, we have unclear
expectations for the effect of fact-check exposure on subsequent candidate evaluations.
Stimuli
To maximize the external validity of our experiments, we adopted actual candidate state-
ments from the 2016 presidential election. In our experiments, we focus on misleading
claims made by Donald Trump in two high-profile candidate appearances — a suggestion
of dramatically rising crime in his nomination acceptance speech (study 1) and a claim
about the loss of manufacturing jobs during one of the presidential debates (study 2).
Both claims were fact-checked by journalistic outlets at the time. The treatments we use
in the studies aim to match the fact checks published for corresponding misstatements.5
For instance, our fact-check of Trump’s convention statements about the prevalence of
violent crime in Study 1 is very similar to the approach used by journalistic fact checkers.
Here is the Associated Press fact-check of the crime claims Trump made in his convention
speech (Sullivan and Day 2016):
THE FACTS: Violent crime has dropped dramatically since the early 1990s.
According to FBI data , the national violent crime rate last peaked in 1991 at
758 reported violent crimes per 100,000 people. In 2014, the latest year for
which full data is available, the rate was 366 per 100,000 people.
Our fact-check for the same issue in Study 1 is very similar:
5As we describe below, we also seek to maximize the realism of the treatments we use
to test the effects of elite messages denigrating a fact-check. Study 1 tests the effects of
exposure to actual statements made by Paul Manafort, Trump’s campaign chairman at the
time, challenging the fact-checking of Trump’s convention speech.
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According to FBI’s Bureau of Justice Statistics, the violent crime rate has
fallen dramatically and consistently over time. According to their estimates,
the homicide rate in the U.S. in 2015 was half that recorded in 1991.
Study 2 considers the effect of fact-checking Trump’s claims about job loss in Michi-
gan and Ohio during the first presidential debate. Politico’s “wrongometer” wrote the
following in response to that claim:
In fact, the state’s unemployment rate has declined in recent years, according
to the Bureau of Labor Statistics. That figure now stands around 4.5 percent,
down from a 14.9 percent unemployment rate in June 2009 (Politico 2016).
Similarly, the New York Times wrote the following about Trump’s claim:
Ohio and Michigan have, indeed, suffered major manufacturing job losses
over the past generation. But in the past year, Ohio has gained 78,300 jobs,
and Michigan has gained 75,800 jobs. In August, the unemployment rate was
4.9 percent in Michigan and 4.7 percent in Ohio, both in line with the national
rate (New York Times 2016).
Our fact-check for this same issue (described further below) reads as follows:
In fact, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, unemployment has fallen
in both Michigan and Ohio. Both states each saw 70,000 new jobs over the
last year.
We believe our treatments are faithful representations of the type of journalistic fact-
checking that is now widely disseminated by the media. In other words, our experiment
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is not a test of authoritative and logically infallible attempts to debunk false claims. It is
instead an analysis of how journalistic fact-checks affect mass beliefs and attitudes.6
Study 1: Crime perceptions
Study 1 tested the effects of journalistic fact-checks about changes in levels of crime over
time. Respondents were randomly assigned to one of five conditions. In a control condi-
tion, respondents read an article without any political content. Participants in the treatment
conditions read a mock news article featuring misleading claims by Donald Trump about
crime rates based on an actual article that originally appeared on CNN.com. In one treat-
ment condition, participants read an article that omits any corrective information, allowing
us to test the effect of exposure to a candidate’s statement alone. Others were assigned to
read versions of the article that include neutral corrective information in the style of jour-
nalistic fact-checking, allowing us to test its effects versus a no-correction version of the
6It is important to note that journalistic fact-checks do not always logically contradict a
speaker (e.g., Marietta and Bowser 2015; Uscinski and Butler 2013). Fact-checkers often
seek instead to address possible inferences that listeners might draw from a candidate’s
statement. For instance, Trump’s nomination speech described an “epidemic” of violent
crime. He did not directly state that crime has increased, but a listener might infer as much
(indeed, Trump made clear statements about increasing crime rates at other times). Like
other journalistic fact-checks, our treatment thus cites FBI data on the long-term decline
in violent crime. Similarly, Trump’s debate statement emphasized factory jobs leaving
Ohio and Michigan. While he did not directly say that employment in Michigan and Ohio
is suffering because of trade policy, he implied that widespread job loss was taking place.
Consequently, our fact-check, like several in the media, provided data on changes in jobs
and unemployment in those states.
10
article as well as the control condition. One condition tested the fact-check alone, while
two other conditions tested whether elite political actors can cultivate resistance to factual
information. In these conditions, the fact-check was followed by a statement from a Trump
surrogate disparaging the validity of the information or a statement by the surrogate dis-
paraging the validity of the information and attributing a political motive to the source of
the information.
Experimental design and instrument
After a series of demographic and attitudinal questions, participants were assigned to one
of five conditions.7 The treatments were based on actual news events during the 2016
Republican National Convention. In his speech, Trump described an America ridden by
increasing crime (uncorrected claim). As the media pointed out, however, these depictions
were contradicted by FBI crime data showing a long-term secular decline (journalistic
fact-check). When Paul Manafort, Trump’s then-campaign chairman, was pressed about
this discrepancy (Schleifer 2016), he questioned the validity of FBI statistics (rejection
of the fact-check) and suggested the FBI could not be trusted because it did not recom-
mend indicting Hillary Clinton in her email scandal (conspiracy theory/fact-check source
derogation).
The specific treatments shown to participants are as follows:
• Control: A birdwatching article.
• Rising crime message: A news article summarizing Trump’s claims
• Rising crime message + fact-check: A news article summarizing Trump’s claims
with a fact-check citing FBI statistics.
7The full instrument is in Online Appendix A.
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• Rising crime message + fact-check + denial: A news article summarizing Trump’s
claimswith a fact-check citing FBI statistics and a statement fromManafort rejecting
the statistics.
• Rising crime message + fact-check + denial + source derogation: A news article
summarizing Trump’s claims about crime with a fact-check citing FBI statistics, a
statement from Manafort rejecting the statistics, and Manafort’s contention that the
FBI was not to be trusted.
Outcome variables
After treatment, subjects were asked two article recall questions to measure receipt of
treatment. We then measured several outcome variables of interest. To assess motivated
resistance, we asked people’s beliefs about changes in the crime rate. We also asked
about perceptions of the accuracy of federal crime statistics and the treatment article and
whether/how the treatment article was biased. In addition, respondents were asked to
choose among interpretations of crime trends, which were coded for belief consistency.8
Finally, we measured evaluations of Trump and other politicians.
Results
Responses were collected on September 30, 2016 by Morning Consult (n= 1,203) and on
Mechanical Turk (n = 2,983).9 To assess our hypotheses, we performed a series of OLS
8Per our preregistration, respondents who indicated crime was up due to inequality or
unemployment were coded as -1 (liberal), those who said crime was up due to moral de-
cline or down due to tougher policing were coded as 1 (conservative), and other responses
were coded as 0.
9Demographic and balance data for both samples are provided in Online Appendix C.
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regressions with robust standard errors.10 All treatment effect estimates are unweighted
intent to treat effects.11 In the pre-treatment vote choice questions, a small percentage of
respondents did not support Trump or Clinton; per our preregistration, we exclude them
from subsequent analyses.12
To evaluate motivated resistance, we test whether the marginal effect of exposure to
the fact-check conditions on misperceptions about crime is null or positive for Trump sup-
porters and whether the difference in effects is significant compared to Clinton supporters.
To evaluate differential acceptance, we test whether the marginal effect of exposure to the
conditions including a fact-check is negative for Trump supporters and whether the differ-
ence in treatment effects is significant versus Clinton supporters. We also measure source
derogation and counterargument to understand how respondents respond to fact-checks.
Table 1 presents the effects of themanipulation on beliefs about changes in crimewhere
the control condition is the excluded category. These estimates are calculated among
Trump and Clinton supporters (the latter are thus the excluded category for the Trump
support indicator). The table also reports auxiliary quantities representing differences
versus the uncorrected statement condition.
Our results indicate that journalistic fact-checking had a pronounced effect on fac-
10All analyses in this section are consistent with our preregistration unless otherwise
indicated. OLS models are replicated using ordered probit where applicable in Online
Appendix C.
11Mean scores on two attention checks were 1.62 and 1.92 for controls and 1.59 and
1.87 for the treatment groups onMorning Consult andMechanical Turk, respectively. (See
Online Appendix A for wording.) We therefore deviate slightly from our preregistration
to omit consideration of response time as a measure of attention.
12We report equivalent but more complex models estimated on the full sample in Online
Appendix C.
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Table 1: Message exposure effects on beliefs about changes in crime
Morning Consult Mechanical Turk
Trump support 0.52*** 0.81***
(0.16) (0.11)
Uncorrected statement -0.34* -0.05
(0.18) (0.09)
Uncorrected × Trump support 0.35 0.16
(0.23) (0.16)
Fact-check -0.94*** -0.97***
(0.19) (0.10)
Fact-check × Trump support 0.09 0.11
(0.26) (0.18)
Fact-check denial -0.74*** -0.94***
(0.19) (0.09)
Fact-check denial × Trump support 0.21 0.38**
(0.27) (0.17)
Denial/source derogation -1.12*** -0.77***
(0.19) (0.10)
Denial/source derogation × Trump support 0.61** 0.29*
(0.27) (0.17)
Constant 3.64*** 3.01***
(0.12) (0.06)
Fact-check − uncorrected statement
Clinton supporters -0.61*** -0.92***
(0.19) (0.10)
Trump supporters -0.86*** -0.97***
(0.18) (0.15)
Denial − uncorrected statement
Clinton supporters -0.41** -0.89***
(0.19) (0.09)
Trump supporters -0.55*** -0.67***
(0.19) (0.14)
Denial/derogation − uncorrected statement
Clinton supporters -0.78*** -0.72***
(0.19) (0.10)
Trump supporters -0.52*** -0.59***
(0.20) (0.14)
R2 0.14 0.19
N 990 2430
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < .01 (two-sided). OLS models with robust standard
errors. All independent variables are dichotomous indicators. Dependent variable is a five-
point scale of perceived change in crime incidence where higher values indicate perceived
greater incidence. Participants are respondents fromMorning Consult or Mechanical Turk
who supported Hillary Clinton or Donald Trump in the 2016 election (reference category
for Trump support is thus Clinton support).
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tual beliefs. Though Trump’s supporters were more likely than Clinton’s to believe that
crime had increased or not declined significantly over the previous ten years, corrective
information reduced misperceptions among supporters of both candidates. Specifically,
respondents exposed to FBI statistics about decreased crime reported significantly lower
misperceptions compared to the uncorrected statement conditions in both samples regard-
less of the candidate they supported (p< .01). Exposure to Trump’s claim did not further
increase misperceptions among his supporters.
Our results are inconsistent with motivated resistance. We do observe some evidence
of differential acceptance, however. Both the fact-check denial on Mechanical Turk (p<
.05) and the denial/source derogation in both samples (p < .05 in Morning Consult, p <
.10 in Turk) reduce crime misperceptions less among Trump supporters than Clinton sup-
porters.13
These findings are illustrated in Figure 1, which presents mean crime perceptions by
condition and candidate support from theMorning Consult data. Mean beliefs about crime
change among Trump supporters declined from 4.17 (out of 5) in the control and uncor-
rected statement conditions to 3.31 in the fact-check condition, 3.62 in the fact-check and
denial condition, and 3.65 in the fact-check/denial/source derogation condition. Similar
declines are observed among Clinton supporters.
To understand these responses, we examine how the treatments affect judgments of
the accuracy and fairness of the articles. Table 2 demonstrates that fact-checks provoke
different perceptions of accuracy and fairness among Clinton and Trump supporters. More
specifically, this table presents results from statistical models available in Table C6 in
Online Appendix C that estimate the effect of the manipulation on the perceived fairness
and accuracy of the stimulus article and the perceived accuracy of federal crime statistics
13These quantities are estimated with respect to the control condition. These differences
are not significant relative to the uncorrected condition.
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Figure 1: Crime perceptions by treatment condition and candidate support
Mean beliefs about crime change by candidate preference and experimental condition.
Survey data from Morning Consult.
for Clinton and Trump supporters relative to the uncorrected condition.
Relative to the uncorrected statement condition, Clinton supporters view the article as
more accurate and fair when a fact-check is present. In three of four comparisons, they
even view federal crime statistics as more accurate when Trump’s staffer questions them.
By contrast, Trump supporters view the article as less accurate and fair when it includes a
fact-check — a contrast with their reported factual beliefs, which became more accurate.
Trump supporters are also less likely to view federal crime statistics as accurate when they
are invoked in a fact-check, especially when questioned by a Trump staffer (p < .01 in
each denial condition versus the uncorrected condition).
To illustrate these findings, we plot the means of the perceived accuracy of the stimu-
lus article and federal crime statistics by condition and candidate support for the Morning
Consult data in Figure 2. When Trump supporters receive a fact-check, they are less likely
to see the article or federal crime statistics as accurate (mean of 2.7 for both) compared
to when they receive Trump’s uncorrected statement (means of 2.8 and 3.0, respectively).
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Figure 2: Perceived accuracy of article and federal crime statistics by treatment condition
and candidate support
Mean perceived accuracy and fairness of the stimulus article and perceived accuracy of
federal crime statistics by candidate preference and experimental condition. Survey data
from Morning Consult.
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Table 2: Message exposure effects on perceptions of accuracy and fairness
Article accurate Article fairness Statistics accurate
MC MT MC MT MC MT
Fact-check − uncorrected
Clinton supporters 0.40*** 0.65*** 0.26** 0.56*** 0.04 0.08*
(0.11) (0.05) (0.11) (0.06) (0.09) (0.04)
Trump supporters -0.17* -0.21*** -0.24*** -0.30*** -0.33*** -0.11
(0.10) (0.08) (0.09) (0.07) (0.10) (0.07)
Denial − uncorrected
Clinton supporters 0.43*** 0.69*** 0.28** 0.47*** 0.12 0.14***
(0.10) (0.06) (0.11) (0.06) (0.08) (0.04)
Trump supporters -0.19* -0.06 -0.37*** -0.26*** -0.46*** -0.21***
(0.11) (0.08) (0.11) (0.07) (0.11) (0.07)
Denial/derogation − uncorrected
Clinton supporters 0.47*** 0.68*** 0.24** 0.41*** 0.15* 0.11**
(0.10) (0.06) (0.11) (0.06) (0.08) (0.04)
Trump supporters -0.16 -0.10 -0.23** -0.22*** -0.34*** -0.16**
(0.10) (0.07) (0.10) (0.07) (0.10) (0.07)
* p< 0.10, ** p< 0.05, *** p< .01. Auxiliary quantities from OLS models with robust
standard errors reported in Table C6. All independent variables are dichotomous indica-
tors. For each dependent variable, higher values indicate greater accuracy and fairness
(each measured on a four-point scale). Participants are respondents from Morning Con-
sult (MC) or Mechanical Turk (MT) who supported Hillary Clinton or Donald Trump in
the 2016 election (reference category for Trump support is thus Clinton support).
The opposite pattern is frequently observed among Clinton supporters, who view the ar-
ticle as more accurate when a fact-check is included (mean of 2.9 versus 2.5). These re-
sponses do not vary in the presence of fact-check denial or source derogation; the response
seems driven by the presence of a fact-check.14
The differences in perceptions of the articles that we observe can be interpreted as
consistent with H3. However, as Table C11 in Online Appendix shows, we do not find
evidence that people interpret the changes in crime they perceive in a viewpoint-consistent
manner (e.g., “[t]ougher policing and longer prison sentences” for Trump supporters who
think crime has decreased).
Finally, we estimate the marginal effect of fact-checking on evaluations of Trump
14Findings are similar for perceived article bias (see Online Appendix C).
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among Clinton and Trump supporters in Table 3. Specifically, we asked subjects to eval-
uate both candidates on a 1–5 scale ranging from “Very unfavorable” to “very favorable.”
We find no significant effects of the fact-check on favorability toward Trump regardless of
respondents’ candidate preference.15
In sum, the evidence from Study 1 shows that, even if people are inclined to take a
skeptical view of a fact-checking article and the data underlying it, fact-checks can still
spur people to hold more factually accurate beliefs. However, these changes in belief
accuracy do not seem to lead to corresponding changes in attitudes toward the candidate
being fact-checked.
Study 2
One limitation of Study 1 is that we examined the effects of a fact-check several weeks after
themisstatement it targetedwasmade. It is possible that subjects had already been exposed
to fact-checking of the misstatements we studied and that this exposure limited the effects
of the fact-check on attitudes toward the candidate. The design of Study 2 addresses this
limitation because it was conducted immediately after the first 2016 presidential debate.
In the first wave of Study 2, 1,546 participants fromMechanical Turk were asked stan-
dard political and demographic questions as well as questions about their access to cable
television and media consumption. They were then instructed to watch the debate and told
15In Table C19 in Online Appendix C, we show that the manipulation had no effect on
favorability toward Clinton or Barack Obama either.
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Table 3: Message exposure effects on Trump favorability
Morning Consult Mechanical Turk
Trump support 2.50*** 2.42***
(0.14) (0.10)
Uncorrected statement -0.03 -0.07
(0.13) (0.06)
Uncorrected × Trump support 0.13 0.12
(0.20) (0.14)
Fact-check 0.10 -0.12*
(0.13) (0.06)
Fact-check × Trump support -0.11 -0.03
(0.20) (0.14)
Fact-check denial 0.10 -0.05
(0.13) (0.07)
Denial × Trump support 0.01 -0.09
(0.20) (0.14)
Denial/source derogation -0.13 -0.05
(0.11) (0.07)
Derogation × Trump support 0.17 -0.06
(0.21) (0.15)
Constant 1.42*** 1.36***
(0.09) (0.05)
Fact-check − uncorrected statement
Clinton supporters 0.14 -0.05
(0.13) (0.06)
Trump supporters -0.10 -0.21
(0.14) (0.13)
Denial − uncorrected statement
Clinton supporters 0.13 0.02
(0.13) (0.06)
Trump supporters 0.01 -0.19
(0.16) (0.14)
Denial/derogation − uncorrected statement
Clinton supporters -0.09 0.02
(0.11) (0.06)
Trump supporters -0.06 -0.17
(0.18) (0.14)
R2 0.62 0.58
N 989 2430
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < .01. OLS models with robust standard errors. All
independent variables are dichotomous indicators. The dependent variable is a five-point
scale where higher values indicate greater favorability. Participants are respondents from
Morning Consult or Mechanical Turk who supported Hillary Clinton or Donald Trump in
the 2016 election (reference category for Trump support is thus Clinton support).
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they would be invited to take a survey immediately after its conclusion.16 As soon as the
debate ended, participants were invited to complete a survey that included questions about
candidates’ debate performances and respondents’ general attitudes towards the candidates
(Wave 2). It included the following statement from Trump:
Our jobs are fleeing the country to Mexico... they’re building some of the
biggest, most sophisticated plants. Not so much in America. Thousands of
jobs leavingMichigan, Ohio...their companies are just leaving, they’re gone.17
The claim that large numbers of jobs were leavingMichigan andOhio at the time due to
factories beingmoved abroad is inaccurate. As fact-checkers pointed out on the night of the
debate, employment had not fallen in either state. The New York Times fact-check pointed
to the number of new jobs created in each state over the previous year (New York Times
2016). A fact-check by National Public Radio (NPR) of this Trump statement directed
readers to the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) for data confirming the fact check—and
rebutting Trump (National Public Radio 2016).
After seeing Trump’s claim, respondents were randomly assigned with probability .5
to receive the following fact-check: “In fact, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics,
16Because the broader experiment in which Study 2 was embedded was designed to
examine how post-debate news coverage affected debate perceptions, participants were
assigned to one of five content consumption conditions that were orthogonal to the ran-
domization we examine here (C-SPAN with no post-debate coverage, Fox News with or
without post-debate coverage, or MSNBC with or without post-debate coverage). We ex-
cluded subjects who did not have access to cable and block-randomized by party and pre-
ferred cable channel. For additional details, consult (reference omitted for peer review).
17The instrument was prepared before transcripts were available, so the statement in our
study differs slightly from the official transcript.
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unemployment has fallen in both states. Both states each saw 70,000 new jobs over the
last year.” Like The New York Times’ fact-check on the night of the debate, we pointed
to the number of new jobs created in each state over the previous year; and like NPR’s
fact-check, we explicitly based the claim of the fact check on BLS data.
All respondents then were asked: “Over the last few years, has unemployment gone
up or down in Michigan and Ohio?” Subjects could respond on a five-point scale, from
“Gone down a lot” to “Gone up a lot,” with “Stayed the same” as the middle category. (See
Online Appendix A for exact wording.) This wave was closed by noon the next day. Five
days later, we recontacted participants and measured perceptions of the debate’s winner
and attitudes toward the candidates (Wave 3).18
Study 2 allows us to test for both motivated resistance (H1) and differential acceptance
(H2). Under H1 (motivated resistance), Trump supporters exposed to the fact-check would
not only resist, but come to hold more inaccurate views than uncorrected Trump support-
ers. The fact-check treatment undermined Trump’s claims about the economy and his
opposition to foreign trade, which were central to his candidacy. The claim’s political im-
portance and its clear contradiction by government data makes it a useful test of partisans’
18See Online Appendix C for details on participant demographics and experimental
balance. Though we cannot rule out the possibility of post-treatment bias (Montgomery,
Nyhan, and Torres 2018), we find no significant effect of treatment assignment at wave 2
on wave 3 participation in a simple OLS model (β = 0.05, p> .10).
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responsiveness to fact-checking.19 Under H2 (differential acceptance), Trump and Clinton
supporters who are exposed to the fact-check would both integrate this information, but
Trump supporters would be less accepting of it.
Analysis
We begin with respondents’ beliefs about unemployment in Michigan and Ohio after the
fact-check in Wave 2. Following Study 1, we estimate OLS models with robust standard
errors that include indicators for fact-check exposure and Trump support in Wave 1 and an
interaction term.20 As in Study 1, we restrict our analysis to respondents who reported sup-
porting Clinton or Trump in Wave 1. The outcome measure is coded so that higher values
indicate belief that unemployment stayed the same or increased rather than decreased.
We present results in Table 4. The first model shows that the fact-check decreased mis-
perceptions about unemployment in Michigan and Ohio among both Clinton and Trump
supporters (p< .01). As with Study 1, the evidence from Study 2 does not support moti-
vated resistance (H1). We also find no evidence of differential acceptance, contradicting
H2. The second model shows that these results are consistent when we control for the
19Such fact-checks are common. For instance, more than 60% of the claims rated by
PolitiFact and theWashington Post Fact Checker were found to be mostly or totally false by
both fact-checkers (Lim 2018). Moreover, fact-checkers consider it part of their mission to
check claims against official data sources and frequently do so. Graves (2016, 85) writes,
for instance, that “Fact-checkers always seek official data and often point to examples
like this [a fact-check assessing claims about government spending and job growth using
federal data] to explain what they do.”
20The design does not include a control condition or fact-check denial and denial/source
derogation conditions. The omitted category is an uncorrected statement.
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Table 4: Message exposure effects on unemployment beliefs
(1) (2)
Trump support 0.44∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗
(0.13) (0.13)
Fact-check −0.34∗∗∗ −0.34∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.11)
Fact-check × Trump support −0.20 −0.20
(0.18) (0.18)
Condition: MSNBC (post-debate coverage) 0.06
(0.14)
Condition: MSNBC (no post-debate coverage) 0.03
(0.14)
Condition: Fox (post-debate coverage) −0.13
(0.14)
Condition: Fox (no post-debate coverage) −0.04
(0.15)
Constant 2.70∗∗∗ 2.71∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.12)
Fact-check − uncorrected statement
Clinton supporters -0.34*** -0.34***
(0.11) (0.11)
Trump supporters -0.54*** -0.54***
(0.14) (0.14)
R2 0.05 0.05
N 825 825
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < .01 (two-sided). OLS models with robust standard
errors. Respondents are Mechanical Turk workers who supported Hillary Clinton or Don-
ald Trump and were assigned to watch the first presidential debate in 2016 (reference
category for Trump support is thus Clinton support). All independent variables are di-
chotomous indicators. The dependent variable is a five-point scale of perceived change in
unemployment in Ohio and Michigan where higher values indicate a perceived increase
in unemployment. The omitted category for the media manipulation is C-SPAN with no
post-debate coverage.
orthogonal media manipulation.
Finally, Table 5 considers fact-check effects five days later (Wave 3). We again use OLS
models with robust standard errors to estimate whether exposure to a fact-check affected
perceptions that Trump won the debate, evaluations of his debate performance, and vote
choice. We again include indicators for fact-check exposure and Trump support and an in-
teraction term. We see no evidence that the fact-check affected these outcomes except for
24
perceptions that Trump “won” the debate, which declined slightly among his supporters.
However, vote choice was not affected. Echoing Study 1, fact-checking reduced misper-
ceptions but had no discernible effects on participants’ candidate preferences, including
supporters of the candidate who had been fact-checked.
Table 5: Fact-check effects at Wave 3
Trump won debate Trump favorability Trump vote
Trump support (W1) 0.67∗∗∗ 0.47∗∗∗ 0.89∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.02) (0.03)
Fact-check 0.02 0.01 −0.001
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Fact-check × Trump vote (W1) −0.17∗∗∗ −0.06 −0.01
(0.06) (0.04) (0.04)
Constant 0.02 0.16∗∗∗ 0.03∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Fact-check − uncorrected statement
Clinton supporters -0.02 -0.01 -0.001
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Trump supporters -0.15** -0.05 -0.01
(0.05) (0.03) (0.03)
R2 0.47 0.53 0.81
N 527 527 527
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < .01. OLS models with robust standard errors. All in-
dependent variables are dichotomous indicators. The dependent variables are measured
on a five-point scale where higher values indicate greater belief that Trump won the de-
bate, a more favorable attitude toward Trump, or a greater intention to vote for Trump,
respectively. Respondents are Mechanical Turk workers who supported Hillary Clinton or
Donald Trump in the 2016 election (reference category for Trump support is thus Clinton
support). All outcome measures were collected in wave 3.
Conclusion
In two studies of fact-checking conducted during the 2016 presidential election, we find
that people express more factually accurate beliefs after exposure to fact-checks. These ef-
fects hold even when fact-checks target their preferred candidate. In Study 1, we exposed
participants to variants of an article covering claims Donald Trump made about crime.
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Trump supporters were willing to accept a fact-check of those claims and update their be-
liefs, though we observe some evidence of differential acceptance (i.e., they revised their
beliefs less than Clinton supporters). Similarly, the accuracy of Trump supporters’ be-
liefs about unemployment increased in Study 2 after seeing a fact-check of a claim Trump
made during the first debate. However, exposure to journalistic fact-checks did not affect
attitudes toward him in either study. Ultimately, we find no evidence that changes in fac-
tual beliefs in a claim made by a candidate affect voter preferences during a presidential
election.
Our results on interpretations were mixed. Study 1 participants evaluated the fairness
and accuracy of the stimulus article and the accuracy of the federal crime statistics it cited
in a directionally motivated fashion. However, they did not adopt viewpoint-consistent in-
terpretations of the change in crime. Further research is needed to understand how respon-
dents interpret counter-attitudinal fact-checks and other forms of corrective information.
These results help theoretically inform our understanding of both motivated reasoning
and factual belief updating. As with other recent research (Wood and Porter 2018), we find
little evidence of a backfire effect on respondents’ factual beliefs. However, our results
also do not suggest that respondents accept fact-checks uncritically; exposure to counter-
attitudinal information decreases perceptions of the accuracy of our stimulus article and
the source of counter-attitudinal information in Study 1. These findings suggest motivated
reasoning can coexist with belief updating, a possible explanation for divergent findings
in the literature (e.g., Flynn 2016); they need not be mutually exclusive phenomena (see
also Coppock and Guess N.d. and Khanna and Sood 2018).
Of course, these studies have several limitations. First, we did not test a fact-check
of a Clinton misstatement and cannot evaluate how her supporters would have reacted.
Second, Trump was infamous for extreme exaggerations and misstatements, which may
have made some respondents receptive to fact-checking but also prepared his supporters
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to rationalize their continued support for him. Also, we measured feelings toward the
candidates post-treatment and use them as an outcome measure. It is possible that that the
strongest Trump supporters respond to fact-checks differently than less ardent supporters,
but we are unable to test this conjecture.
Further research is also necessary to determine the extent to which our results gen-
eralize to other contexts or forms of fact-checking. Our results suggest that fact-checks
are unlikely to meaningfully diminish the strong attachments people have to their party’s
candidate in a campaign context with strong partisan cues. Their effects may be stronger,
however, in elections with weaker partisan cues and less well-known figures on the ballot
(e.g., Wintersieck 2017). In addition, fact-checks could have stronger attitudinal effects
on feelings toward politicians the more temporally distant they are from an election. In
addition, the scope of our finding is limited to the effects of a fact-check of a single mis-
statement, the format most often employed by journalists. Correcting a series of inaccurate
claims might have had larger effects on candidate evaluations. Other research might also
consider the effects of joint fact-checking of both major-party candidates or of positive
fact-checks corroborating the accuracy of a candidate’s claim. In addition, future research
should examine affective and emotional responses to candidate misstatements of fact as
well as the fact-checks that set the record straight.
Finally, as with all studies of this sort, we cannot completely rule out acquiescence
bias or demand effects. Recent research indicates that demand effects in Internet-based
survey experiments are relatively rare, however (Mummolo and Peterson N.d.).
Despite these limitations, our results provide compelling evidence that citizens can
accept the conclusions of journalistic fact-checks of misstatements even when they are
made by one’s preferred candidate during a presidential election. This information had
little effect on people’s attitudes toward the candidate being corrected, however. In other
words, Trump supporters took fact-checks literally, but not seriously enough to affect how
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they felt toward their preferred candidate.
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